David Chalmers: Teški problem svijesti

master's thesis

• Title (english): David Chalmers: The hard problem of consciousness
• Author: Leon Petrač
• Mentor: Dalibor Renić (mentor)
• Committee member: Luka Janeš (predsjednik povjerenstva)
• Committee member: Barbara Ćuk (član povjerenstva)
• Committee member: Dalibor Renić (član povjerenstva)
• Granter: University of Zagreb; Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies; Zagreb
• Defense date and country: 2023-07-13, Croatia
• Scientific / art field, discipline and subdiscipline: HUMANISTIC SCIENCES; Philosophy

Abstract

U ovome radu razmotrit ćemo teški problem svijesti kod Davida Chalmersa kroz njegovu raspravu s Danielom C. Dennettom. s obzirom na kvalitativno svjesno iskustvo. Prvotno iznijeti ćemo teorijska stajališta Davida Chalmersa s obzirom na fenomen uma i svijesti kao i kritike koje upućuje fizikalističko-funkcionalističkim teorijama uma i svijesti. Nadalje, izložit ćemo stajalište Daniela Dennetta te njegove kritike upućene Chalmersovim teorijskim temeljima. Imajući na umu dva stajališta, usporedbom tih stajališta iznjedriti ćemo njihove dodirne točke kako bismo prikazali na koji način se one razlikuju kako bi zadobili jasan kontekst diskursa. Slijedom toga, iznijeti ćemo mane i ukazati na neopravdanost ontoloških pretpostavki na kojima se gradi stajalište Davida Chalmersa te kako s obzirom na njih njegova kritika fizikalističko-funkcionalističkih teorija nije opravdana jer ne ukazuje na anomalije unutar samog teorijskog okvira kojeg kritizira već sa stajališta koje podrazumijeva drugačije ontološke pretpostavke. S time na umu teški problem svijesti, predstavit ćemo kao problem relativan određenim ontološkim teorijskim okvirima, a ne univerzalan problem koji se proteže kroz sve teorijske okvire.

Abstract (english)

In this paper we will consider the nature of the discourse that takes place between David Chalmers and Daniel C. Dennett with regard to qualitatively conscious experience. We will initially present David Chalmers' theoretical views with regard to the phenomenon of mind and consciousness as well as the criticisms he makes about the physio-functionalist theories of mind and consciousness. Furthermore, we will present Daniel Dennett's position and his criticisms of Chalmers' theoretical foundations. Bearing in mind the two positions, by comparing these views we will produce their points of contact to show how they differ with regard to conscious experience in order to gain a clear context of discourse. Consequently, we will present the flaws and point out the unjustified ontological assumptions on which David Chalmers' position is built and from which he criticizes physio-functionalist theories. Finally, we will show how hard problem of consciousness, is a problem relative to certain ontological theoretical frameworks and not a universal problem.

• Keywords: Iskustvo; svijest
• Keywords (english): Experience; consciousness
• Language: croatian
• URN:NBN: urn:nbn:hr:260:044315
• Study programme: Title: Philosophy; Study programme type: university; Study level: graduate; Academic / professional title: magistar/magistra filozofije (magistar/magistra filozofije)
• Type of resource: Text
• File origin: Born digital
• Access conditions: Closed access
• Created on: 2023-07-19 10:16:25